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CASE COMMMENT
HABEAS CORPUS: WHAT THE CLOSING OF GUANTANAMO
BAY MEANS FOR FUTURE CHALLENGES TO EXECUTIVE
DETENTION FROM ABROAD
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008)
Jay Yagoda*

In the wake of September 11, 2001, Congress authorized President
Bush to wage a military campaign against al Qaeda and the Taliban
regime that supported it. Petitioners, foreign nationals captured by U.S.
armed forces in Afghanistan and abroad for their alleged connection to
al Qaeda and 9/11, were detained at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, and classified by Combatant Status Review Tribunals as
enemy combatants.2 While the United States exercises jurisdiction over
J.D. expected May 2010, University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of Law; B.A.
in Criminology & History, May 2007, University of Florida. I dedicate this Comment to my
family and friends for their constant support and continual motivation.
1. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240-41 (2008). After the September 11,
2001 attacks, Congress authorized the President to:
[U]se all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations,
or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the
United States by such nations, organizations, or persons.
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 § 2(a) (2001).
Subsequent to Congress's passing of the Authorization for Use of Military Force, the U.S.
Supreme Court recognized that the detention of individuals who fought the United States in
Afghanistan during conflict was an "accepted" incident to war and a "necessary and appropriate
force" Congress authorized the President to use. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518
(2004) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
2. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2241. After the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdi,
"the Deputy Secretary of Defense established Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) to
determine whether individuals detained at Guantanamo Bay were 'enemy combatants."' Id.
Congress defines an "unlawful enemy combatant" as "a person who has engaged in hostilities or
who has purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States . . . who is
not a lawful enemy (including a person who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated
forces) . . . ." 10 U.S.C. § 948a(1)(A)(i) (2006). The term also includes "a person who . . . has
been determined to be an unlawful enemy combatant by a [CSRT] or other competent tribunal
established under the authority of the President or the Secretary of Defense." 10 U.S.C. §
948(1)(A)(ii). However, in the instant case, each Petitioner denied membership in the al Qaeda
347
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the base, the base's land remains part of Cuba's sovereign territory. 3 in
two separate cases, Petitioners sought writs of habeas corpus from the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia challenging the legality
of their detention.4 On remand, the district court, in one instance,
dismissed the petitions for lack of an actionable claim;6 in a separate
action, the court held Petitioners were denied due process.7 Petitioners'
cases were then consolidated, and together, they appealed to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.8 However, while
the appeal was pending, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act
(MCA), denying alien enemy combatants detained at Guantanamo
access to habeas relief.9 As a result, the court of appeals denied
terrorist network or the Taliban regime "that provided sanctuary for al Qaeda." Boumediene,
128 S. Ct. at 2241.
3. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2251-52. Pursuant to a lease agreement with Cuba, the
United States possesses forty-five square miles of Cuban soil. Id. at 2261. Under the terms of
the lease agreement, Cuba retains "ultimate sovereignty" over the territory while the United
States exercises "complete jurisdiction and control." Id. at 2251-52 (citing Lease of Lands for
Coaling and Naval Stations, Feb. 23, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, art. III, T.S. No. 418). However, under
the terms of a later, and final, 1934 treaty, "Cuba effectively has no rights as a sovereign until
the parties agree to modification of the 1903 Lease Agreement or the United States abandons the
base." Id. at 2252 (citing Treating Defining Relations with Cuba, May 29, 1934, U.S.-Cuba, art.
III, 48 Stat. 1683, T.S. No. 866). Additionally, the instant Court noted that in relation to the
instant facts, "[n]o Cuban court ha[d] jurisdiction to hear these petitioners' claims, and no law
other than the laws of the United States applie[d] at the naval station." Id at 2251.
4. Id. at 2241. Petitioners first sought writs of habeas corpus in February 2002, when the
district court dismissed the cases for lack of jurisdiction, citing Guantanamo Bay's location
outside of sovereign U.S. territory as its reasoning. Id. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit then affirmed those decisions. Id. In Rasul v. Bush, the U.S.
Supreme Court "reversed, holding that [the pre-amended] 28 U.S.C. § 2241 extended statutory
habeas corpus jurisdiction to Guantanamo." Id. (citing Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473
(2004)). However, the Rasul Court failed to address the constitutional issue presented in the
instant cases. Id. (citing Rasul, 542 U.S. at 476).
5. See supra note 4. After reversing the court of appeals' judgment, the U.S. Supreme
Court, in Rasul, "remand[ed] these cases for the District Court to consider in the first instance
the merits of [P]etitioners' claims." Rasul, 542 U.S. at 485.
6. See Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 324 (D.D.C. 2005), rev'd, Boumediene, 128
S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
7. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 472 (D.D.C. 2005),
rev'd, Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
8. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2241.
9. See id. While Petitioners' district court decisions were pending, Congress first passed
the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA). Id. Pursuant to the DTA's terms, Congress amended the
federal habeas statute, providing that "no court, justice, or judge shall [have] jurisdiction to hear
or consider . . . an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien
detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba . . . ." Detainee Treatment
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e)(l)-(2), 119 Stat. 2739, 2742 (2005), amended by
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2007)) (repealed by Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229)). However,
in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the U.S. Supreme Court held that this provision of the DTA did not
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Petitioners' writs, explaining that without statutory authority or U.S.
sovereignty over Guantanamo, it lacked jurisdiction.'o The U.S.
Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the United States
exercised functional control over Guantanamo, Petitioners were entitled
to request habeas relief."
On January 22, 2009, President Obama issued executive orders
directing the prompt closure of the Guantanamo Bay detention
facilities, ending the CIA's secret overseas prisons, and banning
coercive interrogation methods.' 3 Reversing President Bush's heavily
criticized counterterrorism policies,14 President Obama's orders
rendered moot the instant Court's holding as it pertains to current
Guantanamo detainees. The detainees' habeas corpus proceedings have
been stayed until the Obama administration "make[s] a broad
assessment of detention policy."' 5 With Guantanamo's closing, the
question remains whether the instant Court's unprecedented extension
of the writ will apply to alien enemies held at other U.S. detention
facilities abroad.
Since its origins at common law,16 the writ of habeas corpus has
served as a beacon for individual liberty and as a restraint on lawless
executive detention.17 The writ is so important, in fact, that the
Suspension Clause of the Constitution expressly limits its formal

apply to Petitioners' cases, which were pending when the DTA was enacted. See Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 576-77 (2006). In response, Congress passed the Military
Commissions Act (MCA), which amended the federal habeas statute 28 U.S.C. § 2241 yet again
to eliminate federal court jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions from enemy detainees held at
Guantanamo, including Petitioners' pending claims. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2242 (citing
Military Commissions Act § 7 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (repealed by
Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229))).
10. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2242 (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 987,
990-91 (2007)).
11. See id. at 2262, 2277.
12. See Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009). Executive Order No.
13,492 mandates that the Guantanamo Bay detention facilities be closed within a year. Id.
13. See Scott Shane, Obama Orders Secret Prisons and Detention Camps Closed, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 23, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/23/us/politics/
23GITMOCND.html?pagewanted=1&_r-1.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2245 (discussing the history of the writ of habeas
corpus and its issuance at common-law in the courts of England "to enforce the King's
prerogative to inquire into the authority of a jailer to hold a prisoner").
17. See Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290-91 (1969); see also Munaf v. Geren, 128 S.
Ct. 2207, 2221 (2008) (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004)) (explaining that
habeas is "at its core a remedy for unlawful executive detention"); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54,
58 (1968) (finding that the writ of habeas corpus is "both the symbol and guardian of individual
liberty").
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suspension to times of war or invasion.' 8 With the writ's resilient ability
to challenge the legality of imprisonment, both citizens and alien
detainees have invoked its protections.' 9 During World War II, the U.S.
Supreme Court employed two factors-citizenship and location-to
determine the writ's scope. 20 However, the twenty-first century's War
on Terror persuaded the Court to all but abandon those factors in favor
of a third factor-practicality-to restore individual liberty to its lawful
21
position.
More than sixty years before the closing of Guantanamo, in Ex parte
Quirin, the U.S. Supreme Court established the original framework for
an enemy alien detainee's right to seek habeas relief during wartime.22
In Quirin, eight German soldiers, wearing German uniforms and
carrying explosives, landed on American soil upon orders from the
German Reich to destroy U.S. war industries.23 But before their plan
was executed, the German saboteurs were detained and tried by a U.S.
military tribunal for violatin the law of war.2 4 The soldiers petitioned
for writs of habeas corpus, 2 challenging the constitutionality of their
trial by military tribunal. Rejecting the government's argument that
U.S. courts lacked jurisdiction to hear the claims of aliens and
belligerents,2 7 the U.S. Supreme Court held that enemy aliens detained
within the United States were entitled to petition for habeas relief.2 8
Although the Quirin Court found the prisoners' foreign status
18. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2246 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2).
19. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004) (considering an American
citizen's habeas petition); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1942) (determining whether
enemy aliens detained within the United States were entitled to petition for habeas relief).
20. See, e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 790-91 (1950) (denying enemy aliens
detained by U.S. forces abroad the right to petition for the writ of habeas corpus because such a
right could only be extended to U.S. citizens); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1,4-6 (1946) (allowing
consideration for habeas petition filed by enemy alien detained in Philippines because of
detainee's location within a U.S. sovereign territory).
21. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2253-62 (reading previous Supreme Court precedent as
applying a practical approach in considering whether enemy aliens detained in Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba could petition a U.S. federal court for a writ of habeas corpus).
22. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 24-25.
23. Id. at 21.
24. See id. at 21, 22.
25. Id. at 18-19.
26. Id. at 24. The Nazi prisoner's main argument on petition for habeas relief was that the
"President [was] without any statutory or constitutional authority to order the petitioners to be
tried by military tribunal for offenses with which they [were] charged." Id. Further, the prisoners
argued that "in consequence they [were] entitled to be tried in the civil courts with the
safeguards, including trial by jury, which the Fifth and Sixth Amendments guarantee[d] to all
persons charged in such courts with criminal offenses." Id.
27. See id. at 25.
28. Id.
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inconsequential, the location of their detainment was not.29 Because the
Court did not allow the prisoners' status as aliens to foreclose their
access to the U.S. court system, Quirin expanded the writ's scope by
allowing prisoners detained within U.S. territory to challenge the
legality of their detainment, regardless of their citizenship. 30
While Quirin and its progeny3 ' underscored the importance of
location within U.S borders for enemy aliens seeking habeas relief, just
eight years later, Johnson v. Eisentrageradded an additional element,
citizenship, to resolve a similar issue.3 2 In Eisentrager, during World
War II, twenty-one German nationals were tried and convicted in China
by a U.S. Military Commission 33 for engaging in continued military
activity against the United States after Germany had surrendered.
Charged with violating the laws of war, the prisoners were repatriated to
Germany to serve their sentences in U.S. Army custody.3 5 The prisoners
then sought habeas relief in federal court, challenging the legality of
their imprisonment. 3 6 Denying the petitions, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the Constitution did not extend its protections to alien enemies
captured and detained by U.S. armed forces outside U.S. territory.37
In reaching its conclusion, the Eisentrager Court proposed an
ascending scale of rights depending on a detainee's connection to the
United States. 38 With citizenship on one end and non-citizenship on the
29. Id. at 24-25.
30. See id. The Court reasoned that the sheer fact the Nazi prisoners were enemy aliens
could not foreclose "consideration by the courts of petitioners' contentions that the Constitution
and laws of the United States constitutionally enacted forb[ade] their trial by military
commission." Id. at 25.
31. See, e.g., In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1946) (applying the holding in Quirin
when considering a habeas petition filed by an enemy alien detained in the Philippines, a U.S.
territory).
32. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 769-71 (1950).
33. See id. at 765-66. The U.S. Military Commission, authorized by the U.S. Joint Chiefs
of Staff, sat in China with the Chinese government's express consent. Id. at 766.
34. Id.
35. Id. After being repatriated to Germany to serve their sentences, the German nationals
were kept under the custody of an American Army officer. Id.
36. Id. at 767.
37. Id. at 785 (finding that the "Constitution does not confer a right of personal security or
an immunity from military trial and punishment upon an alien enemy engaged in the hostile
service of a government at war with the United States").
38. Id. at 770. The EisentragerCourt explained:
The alien, to whom the United States has been traditionally hospitable, has
been accorded a generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases his
identity with our society. Mere lawful presence in the country creates an
implied assurance of safe conduct and gives him certain rights; they become
more extensive and secure when he makes preliminary declaration of intention
to become a citizen, and they expand to those of full citizenship upon
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other, citizenship provided a much stronger basis for constitutional
protection.39 However, in the absence of citizenship, physical presence
within sovereign U.S. territory granted an alien the most identifiable
rights.4 0 Thus, in Eisentrager,lack of citizenship and location abroad
weighed heavily against granting the German prisoners relief.4 1 Holding
otherwise, the Court reasoned, would have led to an absurd4 2 and
impractical result. 43
Over fifty years later, in Rasul v. Bush," the U.S. Supreme Court,
for the first time, appeared to limit Eisentrager'sholding.45 In Rasul,
after the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. government captured alien enemies
abroad and detained them in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.4 6 Pursuant to the
federal habeas statute4 7 that authorized district courts within their
naturalization. During his probationary residence, this Court has steadily
enlarged his right against Executive deportation except upon full and fair
hearing.
Id. at 770-71.
39. Id. at 770; see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318
(1936) (finding that "[n]either the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any
force in foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens").
40. See Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 770; supra text accompanying note 39.
41. See Eisentrager,339 U.S at 778.
42. Id. at 777. The Court reasoned that to support an opposite conclusion, allowing the
German prisoners to petition for the writ, the Court would then have to hold that:
[A] prisoner of our military authorities is constitutionally entitled to the writ,
even though he (a) is an enemy alien; (b) has never been or resided in the
United States; (c) was captured outside of our territory and there held in
military custody as a prisoner of war; (d) was tried and convicted by a Military
Commission sitting outside the United States; (e) for offenses against laws of
war committed outside the United States; (f) and is at all times imprisoned
outside the United States.
Id. In light of all these factors, the Court concluded that it would have to go much further to
"invest these enemy aliens, resident, captured and imprisoned abroad, with standing to demand
access to our courts." Id.
43. In Eisentrager,the majority explained that "[t]o grant the writ to these prisoners might
mean that our army must transport them across the seas for hearing." Id. at 778-79. This would
require "allocation of shipping space, guarding personnel and rations" and "might also require
transportation for whatever witnesses the prisoners desire to call as well as transportation for
those necessary to defend the legality of the sentence." Id. at 778-79.
44. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
45. See id. at 472-73. Prior to Rasul, the courts interpreted Eisentragerto hold that the
right to petition for habeas corpus did not extend to aliens in military custody who were not
physically present in any sovereign U.S. territory. Id.
46. In Rasul, the aliens detained at Guantanamo originally consisted of two Australian
citizens and twelve Kuwaiti citizens. Id. at 470. All the detainees were captured abroad during
hostilities between the United States and the Taliban. Id. at 470-71.
47. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000).
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respective jurisdictionS48 to entertain habeas applications for detainees
held in violation of the laws of the United States, 9 the alien detainees in
Rasul petitioned for habeas relief to challenge the legality of their
confinement.50 In addressing whether the statute granted federal courts
the jurisdiction to hear petitions from aliens detained at Guantanamo,
the Supreme Court concluded that although the United States lacked
"ultimate sovereignty" over the Cuban base, its "plenary and exclusive
jurisdiction" over the territory sufficiently justified jurisdiction.5 '
Although the Rasul Court acknowledged Eisentrager's precedent
that aliens being held in non-sovereign U.S. territory precluded any
right to habeas relief, it easily distinguished the facts of Rasul from
2
Eisentrager.5
First, Rasul's reasoning rested on statutory
5
3
interpretation. Second, the Rasul detainees were not nationals of a
country at war with the United States, were refused access to any
adjudicatory tribunal, and admitted to no wrongdoing.5 4 Third, the U.S.
government's plenary control of Guantanamo was the practical
equivalent of "sovereignty" over that territory. Despite allowing the
petitions to proceed, the Court left unresolved the question of whether

48. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 473 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a)).
49. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)). Subsequent to the Court's decision in Rasul,
Congress enacted the MCA in 2006 to prohibit federal court jurisdiction over habeas claims of
Guantanamo Bay detainees labeled as "enemy combatants." See also supra note 9.
50. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 470-72.
51. Id. at 475, 483.
52. Id at 475-76.
53. See id. at 476 (observing the EisentragerCourt's failure to analyze the question of
statutory entitlement to habeas review). The EisentragerCourt was unable to locate any statute
that conferred jurisdiction upon federal courts to entertain habeas petitions from detainees
captured and detained outside U.S. borders. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 768 (1950).
54. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 476. In distinguishing Eisentragerfrom Rasul, the Court explicitly
stated:
Petitioners in these cases differ from the Eisentrager detainees in important
respects: They are not nationals of countries at war with the United States, and
they deny that they have engaged in or plotted acts of aggression against the
United States; they have never been afforded access to any tribunal, much less
charged with and convicted of wrongdoing ....
Id.
55. Id. at 476, 481-82. The express terms of the U.S. agreement with Cuba dictates that
the United States exercises complete jurisdiction and control over the Guantanamo Bay Naval
Base. Id. at 480. In addition, the United States "may continue to exercise such control
permanently if it so chooses." Id. Furthermore, the writ's reach did not depend on "formal
notions of territorial sovereignty," but on practical questions regarding the extent and nature of
the government's jurisdiction over a given territory. Id. at 482; see also supra note 3.
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aliens detained at Guantanamo could challenge the legality of their
detention absent statutory entitlement. 56
Four years later, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Boumediene, upheld the
Rasul standard against the MCA's elimination of statutory habeas
jurisdiction for any enemy combatant held in U.S. custody. 7 The instant
Court concluded that the Constitution extended to alien detainees held
in Guantanamo, making Congress's suspension of habeas corpus
through the MCA a violation of the Suspension Clause. Criticizing the
government's view that the Constitution lacked any force in nonsovereign territory, the instant Court reasoned that to allow such a
callous proposition to stand would effectively permit Congress and the
President to "switch the Constitution on or off at will." 59
Troubled by the outcome if it were to accept the government's
argument as true,60 the instant Court was faced with the dilemma of
preserving Eisentrager'sfifty-year precedent while holding the opposite
to be true. ' Unlike Rasul, the instant Court did not rest its decision on
distinguishing the instant facts from Eisentrager; instead, it interpreted
Eisentrager's holding as relying on practical considerations that
examined the entire circumstances of a prisoner's detention. 62 The
instant Court explained that based on Eisentrager'slanguage, at least
three factors were relevant in determining the Suspension Clause's
reach.6 3 To determine where and when the Clause applied, the instant
Court examined: (1) the citizenship and status of the detainee, including
the adequacy of such designations; (2) the nature of the sites of
apprehension and detention; and (3) the "practical obstacles" that could
impede resolving a "prisoner's entitlement to the writ." 64
56.
based on
57.
58.
59.
60.

See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484 (limiting the Court's holding to alien detainee petitions
the federal habeas statute 28 U.S.C. § 2241 prior to its amendment by the MCA).
See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2241, 2259-62 (2008).
Id. at 2262.
Id. at 2259.
See id. The Court explained:

[TI]he necessary implication of the government's argument is that by
surrendering formal sovereignty over any unincorporated territory to a third
party, while the same time entering into a lease that grants total control over the
territory back to the United States, it would be possible for the political
branches to govern without legal constraint.
Id.
61. Id. at 2257-62; see also id. at 2298 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing that Eisentrager
stands for the exact opposite of proposing a "functional" test for determining the extraterritorial
reach of the writ of habeas corpus).
62. See id. at 2257.
63. Id. at 2259.
64. Id.
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While the instant Court initially explained that the alien enemies
detained at Guantanamo were not citizens, it did contest their
designation as enemy combatants.6 5 Equally important, the instant Court
reasoned, was that nothing indicated that adjudicating the petitions
would cause friction with the Cuban government or compromise the
military mission at Guantanamo.66 While it was true that the detainees
were apprehended and technically detained outside the U.S.'s sovereign
territory, the instant Court found that Guantanamo was in every
functional sense "not abroad." 67 Taken together, the instant Court
concluded that the Suspension Clause had full effect in Guantanamo

Bay. 68
In declaring the MCA unconstitutional, the instant Court, for the first
time, extended constitutional protections to non-citizens detained
outside U.S. territory during wartime.69 Citing the absence of any
historic parallel to the War on Terror, the instant Court's departure from
its prior case law was an obvious response to that war's unprecedented
course. 70 As the instant case demonstrated, securing entitlement to
habeas relief during an incomparable conflict demanded much more
than a bright-line test;7 rather, it required examining the totality of the
circumstances.7 2 With this realization, the instant Court reaffirmed the
writ's earnest ability to secure individual liberty73 while simultaneously
altering the future of the U.S. government's fight against terrorism
abroad.7 4 The Quirin Court emphasized, and the instant Court willingly
65. Id.
66. Id. at 2261.
67. Id. at 2260-61.
68. Id. at 2262.
69. See id. at 2293-94 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (declaring that "[tioday, for the first time in
our Nation's history, the Court confers a constitutional right to habeas corpus on alien enemies
detained abroad by our military forces in the course of an ongoing war").
70. See id. at 2262.
71. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 785 (1950). Eisentrager created a
categorical rule that aliens captured and detained on non-sovereign U.S. territory could not
petition the courts for habeas corpus. See id.; see also supra note 42.
72. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2257. In reaching its ultimate decision, the instant Court
relied on practical considerations that "weighed heavily" in cases such as Eisentrager.Id.
73. Id. at 2259. The instant Court explained:
The Constitution grants Congress and the President the power to acquire,
dispose of, and govern territory, not the power to decide when and where its
terms apply. Even when the United States acts outside of its borders, its powers
are not "absolute and unlimited" but are subject to "such restrictions as are
expressed in the Constitution."
Id. (quoting Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 44 (1885)).
74. See id. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In his vocal dissent, Justice Scalia admonished
that the "game of bait-and-switch that today's [majority] opinion plays upon the Nation's
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embraced, the concept that in times of war, it is the courts' duty to
preserve the constitutional safeguards of civil liberty. In executing this
duty, the instant Court recognized that complete reliance on a World
War II response to a similar issue could not resolve problems afflicting
today's War on Terror.76
In Quirin, the Court extended the writ to alien enemies detained
within U.S. territory when their alleged wrongdoing was quite
apparent.77 In Eisentrager,the same Court denied extending the writ to
enemy aliens detained in Germany, citing lack of citizenship as a basis
for its denial.7 In both Eisentrager and Quirin, degradation of
individual liberty -

what the writ assertively protects -

was not

implicated. The prisoners in Quirin were allowed to petition for the
writ.8 0 Conversely, although the prisoners in Eisentrager were denied
the writ, the Court noted that the prisoners still obtained a lawful
adjudicatory process in the writ's absence.8 ' Thus, individual liberty
was secured.
Unlike executive detainment during World War II, President Bush
selected Guantanamo Bay because he assumed the Constitution did not
apply there - leaving all executive actions taken there unchecked by
law. 3 The Quirin and Eisentrager Courts declined to question
79

Commander in Chief will make the war harder on us. It will almost certainly cause more
Americans to be killed." Id.
75. See id. at 2259; Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 19 (1942).
76. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2261.
77. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25. In Quirin, German saboteurs landed on U.S. soil at night with
their German uniforms, carrying with them "a supply of explosives, fuses, and incendiary and
timing devices." Id. at 21. After landing, the saboteurs buried their uniforms and attempted to
proceed with their mission to "destroy war industries and war facilities in the United States, for
which they or their relatives in Germany were to receive salary payments from the German
Government." Id. The Quirin Court explained that spies "who secretly and without uniform
pass[] the military lines of a belligerent in time of war . .. for the purpose of waging war by
destruction of life or property, are familiar examples of belligerents who are . . . offenders
against the law of war." Id. at 31.
78. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 785 (1950).
79. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2271 (explaining that "[flor on their own terms, the
proceedings in Yamashita and Quirin, like those in Eisentrager,had an adversarial structure that
[was] lacking here").
80. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 24-25.
81. See Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 786. The Court held that the Military Commission was "a
lawful tribunal to adjudge enemy offenses against the laws of war." Id. Additionally, the
prisoners' petitions illustrated that they were formally accused of violating the laws of war and
"fully informed of [the] particulars of these charges."
82. See case cited supra note 79 and supra text accompanying note 81.
83. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2258-59; id. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The
President relied on our settled precedent in Johnson v. Eisentrager... when he established the
prison at Guantanamo Bay for enemy aliens. Citing that case, the President's Office of Legal
Counsel advised him 'that the great of legal authority indicate[d] that a federal district court
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executive detainment of enemies, not only for national security's sake,
but largely because of that branch's abidance with the laws of war. 84 i
Rasul and the instant case, however, the Court found unpersuasive
President Bush and the executive branch's general reliance on national
security to justify their unchecked powers at Guantanamo.8 5
In each case, the Court employed a balancing test, pitting national
security against individual liberty.86 In Quirin and Eisentrager, the
executive's maintenance of national security did not detract from the
writ's effect, and a careful balance between the two was maintained.
However, in the instant case, the executive's unbridled authority at
Guantanamo tipped the scale too heavily in favor of national security,
allowing the writ's protection of individual liberty to fall at the waist
side.88 To find a proper balance during the War on Terror between the
competing interests of national security and individual liberty, the
instant Court relied on Eisentrager'sless-quoted analysis detailing the
impracticalities of extending the writ to alien enemy combatants
detained abroad.8 9
The instant Court, taking its cue from Rasul's unanswered questions,
generated a non-inclusive, three-factor test to determine whether
detainees at Guantanamo were entitled to the privilege of habeas
corpus.90 To make this determination, the instant Court examined three
factors: the detainee's status and the process by which that status was
determined; the nature of the detention site; and any practical obstacles
blocking entitlement to the writ.9 1 By injecting fluidity into writentitlement determinations for alien enemy detainees, the instant Court
struck a new balance between challenges to the legality of detention and
could not properly exercise habeas jurisdiction over an alien detained at [Guantanamo Bay]."')
(quoting Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin and John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorneys
General, Office of Legal Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Dept. of Defense
(Dec. 28, 2001)). In Justice Scalia's dissent, he also noted that "[hiad the law been otherwise,
the military surely would not have transported prisoners there, but would have kept them in
Afghanistan, transferred them to another of our foreign military bases, and turned them over to
allies for detention." Id. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
84. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 26; supra text accompanying note 81.
85. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2277 (discussing the reconciliation that liberty and
security must make with one another).
86. See id. ("Liberty and security can be reconciled; and in our system they are reconciled
within the framework of the law."); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 499 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 770, 773-75 ("Executive power over enemy aliens,
undelayed and unhampered by litigation, has been deemed, throughout our history, essential to
war-time security."); Quirin,317 U.S. at 25.
87. See Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 773-75; Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25.
88. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2277.
89. Id. at 2257-62.
90. Id. at 2259.
91. Id.
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national security concerns.92 Subsequent case law and government
action will test the strength of this balance and its reliance on
practicality.
The first challenge to the instant Court's holding to preserve
individual liberty arose during subsequent habeas petitions filed by the
numerous alien detainees held at Guantanamo after the instant case was
decided. 94 Of the first twenty-six petitions filed, the U.S. government
has lost twenty-three, indicating the executive's authoritative overstep
in the name of national security. 95 Although all Guantanamo detainee
petitions are currently stayed, more than two hundred petitions have
already been filed.96
Above all else, the instant case has signaled the paradigmatic shift
from President Bush's executive policies to those of newly-elected
President Obama. 97 Opening its fenced-in gates under President Bush,
Guantanamo Bay will ultimately close its doors pursuant to one of
President Obama's first executive orders. 98 In what may resemble a
short-lived victory for alien detainees at Guantanamo, the instant case
serves as a warning to President Obama when employing tactics to
increase combat operations in Afghanistan.9 9
In Justice Scalia's emotional dissent, he admonished that the
majority's foreclosure of Eisentragerwould make it more difficult for
the President to fight terrorism and protect U.S. national security.100
Although President Obama has issued orders to close Guantanamo, he
must now decide, in light of the instant case, whether and how to
continue holding alien enemies detained at other U.S. bases abroad. 0 1
For example, at Bagram, a U.S. military base in Afghanistan, over six
hundred prisoners are being held indefinitely and without charge in a

92. See id. at 2262.
93. Id. at 2295 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
94. See Jacob Sullum, Editorial, Guantanamo Fiasco is Lesson for New President, CHI.
SUN-TIMES, Jan. 22, 2009, at 21.

95. Id. As those petitions and other reports later confirmed, over ninety percent of the
Guantanamo prisoners were captured, not by Americans, but by foreign forces to whom the
United States had promised monetary rewards. Id. In fact, many Guantanamo detainees were
entirely innocent, held based on either the "uncorroborated words of self-interested captors," or
on accusations extracted from tortured prisoners. Id.
96. See Shane, supra note 13.
97. See id.
98. See Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009).
99. Eric Schmitt, Two Prisons,Similar Issuesfor President,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2009, at
Al. President Obama's plan to increase combat operations in Afghanistan "will almost
inevitably generate new waves of detainees." Id.
100. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2294-95 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
101. See Schmitt, supra note 99, at Al.
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"makeshift prison" with few privileges and limited access to lawyers.102
The question the instant case begs is whether the Suspension Clause
should also extend to Bagram and other undisclosed, short-term
prisons. 0 3
Questions concerning the instant case's scope after Guantanamo's
closing will not go unanswered for long, as four Bagram detainees have
already petitioned the district court for habeas corpus challenging their
detention. 104 While the Bush administration responded that the Bagram
prison was different from Guantanamo because the Bagram detainees
were captured on active battle zones, the district court has requested that
the Obama administration "refine" that position. 05 If the district court
applies the instant Court's three-factor test and determines that the U.S.
exercises the same functional control over Bagram as it did at
Guantanamo and that no practical obstacles stand in the court's way of
hearing habeas claims, it will likely grant the detainees' petitions.106
Considering the success of the Guantanamo detainees' petitions that
followed the instant case, Bagram's description, as "tougher and more
spartan"' 0 7 than Guantanamo, does not bode well for the government's
defense to such petitions. If the petitions are allowed to proceed,
President Obama will be required to rethink his detainment strategy for
enemy combatants abroad - including what to do about dangerous
detainees who cannot be tried in American courts, whether to keep
certain interrogation techniques secret, and whether to guarantee that
transferred prisoners will be free of torture in other countries. 1o Faced
with solving the problems that plagued Guantanamo, President Obama's
own fight against terrorism abroad must be reconciled with three
interests - the instant holding, what past habeas petitions have
revealed, and national security.
Even after the order to close Guantanamo Bay's detention facilities,
the instant case's holding remains relevant to the War on Terror's future
and the habeas corpus petitions it produces from abroad.109 If courts
choose to apply the instant Court's test for writ-entitlement broadly, the
government will have to find effective, yet constitutional, ways to
102. See id. Many of the prisoners at Bagram are held in communal cages. Id. Furthermore,
the Bush administration has never granted journalists or human rights advocates access to the
Bagram detention center. Id.
103. See Shane, supra note 13. The CIA, under President Bush's directive, "built a network
of secret prisons in 2002 to house and interrogate senior [all Qaeda figures captured overseas."
Id.
104. See Schmitt, supra note 99, at Al.
105. See id.
106. See supra text accompanying note 72.
107. Schmitt, supra note 99, at Al.
108. See Shane, supra note 13.
109. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2294-95 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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handle alien enemy combatants.11 0 To keep the integrity of the instant
Court's analysis intact, it will no longer be constitutional for the U.S.
government to imprison a suspected terrorist, throw away the key, and
expect no questions to be asked."' If anything, the instant case's legacy
demands that citizens not only ask questions, but that the government
answer those questions truthfully.

110. See id. at 2277.
111. See id.

